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FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE -

RULE

12(e) - MoTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS -The United States brought
an action against defendants, movie distributors and producers, for alleged conspiracies and monopolies in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Defendants moved for a more definite statement or a bill of particulars under
federal rule I 2 ( e) •1 Held, bill of particulars allowed as to demands seeking
ultimate facts, denied as to demands seeking evidentiary matter. United States
v. Schine Chain Theatres, (D. C. N. Y. 1940) I F. R. D. 205.
The bill of particulars developed at common law as an aid to trial rather

1 "Before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by
these rules, within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon him, a party may
move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is
not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial. The motion shall point out the
defects complained of and the details desired. . . • A bill of particulars becomes a part
of the pleading which it supplements." Thus the rule seems to contemplate two situations: (1) where a responsive pleading is permitted and a bill of particulars is necessary to help draw it, and ( 2), where no responsive pleading is permitted, and the bill
may be necessary to prepare for trial.

RECENT DECISIONS
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than to pleading, for in some actions a party could not know what he would
have to meet on trial unless he could obtain more details than the pleadings of
the other litigant were required to specify. For example, in an action in assumpsit wherein the common counts were pleaded, the defendant could get a bill
of particulars before trial to ascertain what constituted the "goods received" or
"services rendered." In actions at law in federal courts before the adoption of
the present rules, the state court rule controlled the motion for a bill, under the
Conformity Act. 2 Prior to the adoption of the present federal rules, a bill of
particulars could be had in equity suits either before or after answering, under
federal equity rule 20. 8 . The holding in the instant case is one of many, which,
in applying the new federal rules, severely restricts the use of a bill of particulars, by treating it as equivalent only to a motion for a more definite statement.
It is clearly in line with the great majority of federal decisions involving rule
r2(e). 4 With such a uniformity in narrowly interpreting the rule, there would
seem to be little present foundation for the fear once felt in some quarters that
bills of particulars would be used as a substitute for the discovery process. 5
Although the rule provides that a party may move for a bill of particulars "to
enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial,"
several reasons are assigned for not allowing the motion to be used to secure
evidentiary facts "to prepare for trial." The rule requires the motion to be made
before responsive pleading, if such a pleading is necessary, and also makes the
bill of particulars a part of the pleading, 6 and since pleadings are supposed to
contain ultimate facts only,7 and to be short, concise, and direct,8 evidentiary
2
Kalabany v. News Syndicate Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1932) 1 F. Supp. 724. Cf.
Hammond Bag & Paper Co. v. Bag & Machine Corp., (D. C. Del. 1932) 56 F. (2d)
863 at 864.
3
Trubenizing Process Corp. v. Jacobson, (D. C. N. Y. 1935) IO F. Supp. 655.
4
Laugharn v. Zimmelman, (D. C. Cal. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 348; Modern Food
Process Co. v. Chester Packing & Provision Co., (D. C. Pa. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 405;
McCarthy v. Schumacher, (D. C. N. Y. 1939) I F. R. D. 8. However, one of the
cases cited in the instant case--Sure-Fit Products Co. v. Med-Vogue Corp., (D. C.
Pa. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 48g-supports the holding here by dicta only, for in fact
evidentiary matter was allowed under the motion for a bill of particulars on the theory
that delay would be avoided thereby, since the same matter could be secured by the
discovery process provided for in rules 26 to 37, inclusive. Cf. Mulloney v. Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston, (D. C. Mass. 1938) 26 F. Supp. 148 at 149, similar in tenor
but doubtful as to the rule involved. Outside of these cases, existence of the discovery
process is given as a reason for not allowing a bill of particulars.
5
Clark, "The Bar and the Recent Reform of Federal Procedure," 25 A. B. A. J.
22 (1939). It is interesting to note that a case cited by the instant case as being
contra, United States v. Paramount Pictures, (D. C. N. Y. 1940) I F. R. D. 100,
did not involve a motion for a bill of particulars nor was one discussed.
6 See note 1, supra; Michelson v. Shell Union Oil Corp., (D. C. Mass. 1940)
1 F. R. D. 183; Sheehan v. Municipal Light and Power Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1940) r
F. R. D. 256.
1 Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation v. Vitamin Technologists, (D. C. Cal.
1939) I F. R. D. 8.
8
Brinley v. Lewis, (D. C. Pa. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 313 at 314; Zoller v. Smith,
Levin & Harris, Inc., (D. C. Pa. 1940) I F. R. D. 182.
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£acts should not be allowed in a document which becomes a part of the pleading.
Furthermore, as the rule requires the party making the motion to specify the
defects in the opposite party's pleadings, it would seem that if the latter's pleadings contain all the ultimate £acts necessary, there would be no defect justifying
the motion. Even under the old equity rule 20, evidentiary £acts could not be
secured by a bill of particulars.9 Chief argument advanced for the instant holding, however, is that under the present federal rules 26 to 37, the discovery
process providing for depositions and interrogatories is available after answer to
secure evidentiary matter in preparation for trial. The bill of particulars, then,
which tends to delay the proceedings, should only be allowed where necessary
to help prepare responsive pleadings,10 and would be unnecessary where responsive pleadings are not allowed. This restriction on the use of a bill has practical
advantages, for it conforms to the spirit of the new rules requiring pleadings to
be simple and concise, eliminates one cause for delay, and avoids duplication
of effort. The discovery process, moreover, was specifically devised as an aid to
preparation for trial, and with the exception of rules 34 and 35 can be used
without the inconvenience of securing permission from the courts, and is more
effective for obtaining complete information.11 The effect of this interpretation
of rule I 2 ( e) is practically to read out of the rule the provision for use of the
bill "to prepare for trial," 12 on the ground that the only £acts which a party
would want in order to prepare for trial would be evidentiary facts. But it is
quite clear that in many cases a party might derive substantial aid in preparing
for trial from a bill of particulars or an amended pleading which merely set
forth additional ultimate facts. Certainly the rule contemplates that these remedies may be used by a party who is required to file no further pleading, for it
expressly says so. In such a case, the information obtainable should be at least
as complete and detailed as an aid in preparing for trial as the party would be
entitled to as an aid in drawing a responsive pleading, were one required. Such
aid in preparing for trial could be given without extending these remedies to
include evidentiary matter, thereby giving effect to the entire rule as drawn.

Oliver B. Crager
9 Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York v. Sayles, (D. C. R. I. 1927) 30 F.
(2d) 178; Midwest Mfg. Co. v. Staynew Filter Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1935) 12 F.
Supp. 876 at 878; Universal Oil Products Co.. v. Skelly Oil Co., (D. C. Del. 1926)
12 F. (2d) 271.
10 Mann v. Cadillac Automobile Co. of Boston, (D. C. Mass. H}39) 29 F. Supp.
495; Securities & Exchange Commission v. Timetrust, (D. C. Cal. 1939) 28 F. Supp.
34; Lasicki v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., (D. C. Pa. 1940) l F. R. D. 384; Louisiana
Farmers' Protective Union v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. of America, (D. C.
Ark. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 483.
n Brinley v. Lewis, (D. C. Pa. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 313 at 314; 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 657, note 20 (1938).
12 Montgomery, "Changes in Federal Practice Resulting from the Adoption of
the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," I F. R. D. 337 at 345 (1940) (address
before judicial conference of the ninth circuit at Los Angeles, California, July 30,
1940); Lasicki v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., (D. C. Pa. 1940) I F. R. D. 384; Brockway Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 1 F. R. D. 242.

